Tuesday, March 18, 2008

To go beyond your place in society

"Fear and Trembling", Soren Kierkegaard, 1843

Introduction

FEAR AND TREMBLING

Preface
Attunement
Speech in Praise of Abraham


PROBLEMATA

Preamble from the Heart
Problema I
Problema II
Problema III <----I am at the beginning of this as I start writing

Epilogue



OK, that's our map to one of my most difficult philosophical undertakings in a while. What people cull from philosophy, however, is rarely what the professor of philosophy culls, as they have been programmed by countless user guides to convey a philosophical text in its primary purpose (ie whatever popular notion of the time relative to philosophical trends at the time dictate). I suppose this is only the complicated way of me saying that what Kierkegaard puts forth here is understood in my own unique standing as: A) An Atheist and B) An Existentialist, and as he speaks of the paradox of going beyond Hegel's universal ethics to movements of faith toward the absurd, I have my place in the world, 2008, to consider. So consider them I will, before I even go to Problema III because I must start figuring out now where it is I stand with Kierkegaard and his analysis of the Binding of Isaac episode of Genesis 22.

I have attempted to put aside my atheism for the sake of understanding the philosophy underpinning the theology of Kierkegaard's writing. He is, after all, talking about what so many secularlists have talked about, the going beyond the universal, or that which is good for the whole. He uses Abraham as an example to show that, through his immediate action, that of sacrificing his son outside the bound of duty (duty to the State it sounds), would be considered ethically reprehensible, it is justified only by his faith, which answers the first Problema which is "Is there a teleological suspension of the ethical?" To me, this points out to a higher calling beyond that of the society, to the origin of mankind, and since I don't believe in God, I find the origin to be within us, or that we are all God, and no doubt omnipotent. Problema II is, "Is there an absolute duty to God?" Kierkegaard says yes, and so do I, for the same and different reasons. Our common ground can be boiled in this sentence: "The paradox of faith is this, that there is an interiority that is incommensurable with the exterior, an interior which, it should be stressed is...a new interiority", meaning, as opposed to the ethical view of life that demands minimizing the interior and giving it an expression only in the exterior, the interior takes new precedence,"the single individual is higher than the universal", "the individual relates himself absolutely, as the single individual, to the absolute." With all the noise of the world, the temptations, the deadliest of sins, it's impossible for me to fathom this type of existence as it is Kierkegaard who can only describe his observances through his narrator Johannes de silentio, and never use himself as an example. Nevertheless, it is a sort of pure being uncovered in meditation, and he is correct in saying it cannot be mediated (I only tell you he is correct because I have experienced self-discovery at isolated times in as close to perfect form as I can fathom through journals and aloneness and readings). I find the absolute duty to God to mean the absolute duty to the Unabated Self inside us, to go beyond the ethical infinite resignation (being resolved to the inevitability of self) and subscribe to the absurd (the full realization, then perfection, of self). The former to me is a group of downtrodden, depressed pedestrians in need of serious in-patient attention. But we all belong to them at some point if we are to accept the inevitable horrors of ourselves. Still, it is then to act with faith toward the absurd--that we can be who we are and be perfect in this lifetime--that can make us dramatically wonderful. This is the most meaningful analogy I can draw to Abraham's movement toward the absurd--that he can sacrifice his son (We can be attuned to the horrors we are and meditate on that level...) and still enjoy his presence again in his lifetime (...And still be perfect in our lifetime). When I say perfect, I mean maximally healthful in all circumstances, Emotionally and Physically, living as perfect individuals and perfect members of society. We can either resolve to the impossibility and shiver for the forever silence and non-being of death (Knight of Infinite Resignation), or we can resolve ourselves to the impossibility and go beyond and move toward the absurd, to the notion that we can be perfect in all senses (Knight of Faith). And like Kierkegaard, I believe I have just said the same thing in three different ways.

I will continue my ramble after I finish the third Problema and the Epilogue.

Or is it like the Buddhist seeking Nirvana, though meditating on the harsh desolation of being. Through this meditation of the harsh desolation of being (the infinite resignation), he goes through another movement toward the attainment of Nirvana. Is this what we're getting at? Or am I hatching a new egg, or, at least, an egg hatched elsewhere in another Atheistic place?

Anyhow, Problem Tres, the last, "Was it ethically defensible of Abraham to conceal his purpose from Sarah, from Eleazar, from Isaac?" It was defensible in his faith, yes. Had he pronounced his purpose to them, they would not have understood anyhow, he would have been speaking gibberish. To say, I am now going to sacrifice Isaac as a trial to God, would have proven incomprehensible to the others. His undertaking would be to express faith, and that, as opposed to expressing the universal (as Socrates did at his death, which made his death all the more profound as an ultimate tragic hero), and Kierkegaard's whole purpose is to show how verbally expressing faith is not possible because it is beyond the universal (which is compelling when meditated upon through silence, or as I'm doing, through writing).

In short, we cannot speak to others what is only comprehensible within ourselves (faith, in this case). We will never come across as we would like.

As a sidenote, the parallel I drew from my own philosophy to Kierkegaard's could be fallible in some way. I wrote it in a stream, as I always do, because I find it typically futile to express one's deep reaction to life in form of a well-conceived, contrived essay. It's an incompatible format. Usually it's not verbally expressible. But I can stick by the premise: That it is one level of self-realization to reconcile ourselves to the horrors that lie deep inside each of us, but to go beyond self-realization to the absurd, that we know our nature is horrible but that we will be perfect in life is the absurd faith worthy of our being.

So what have we learned children?

Kierkegaard's philosophy asserts that faith is the highest of human passion.

Kierkegaard also asserts that faith is the go-beyond of ethical, therefore universal, behavior.

Kierkegaard sees that faith turns ethics inside-out in that ethics requires the giving up of the internal for an expression external, whereas faith shows the internal is immeasurably more important than the external (and is thus, as we see in Problema III not expressed intelligibly by the one who possesses the most impassioned of faith).

Kierkegaard is attacking Hegel's form of ethics. You can infer that he finds Hegel's ethics and their insistence of Society before Individual as oppressive, and as his legacy runs, and with the example of Abraham who is the father of faith, that we as individuals can have an extraordinary mission in life.

Kierkegaard uses Abraham as the ultimate figure of faith, but cannot understand him, and is modest in this approach. Instead he chooses admiration, shows him as someone much more worthy of admiration than an Agamemnon or some other tragic hero who gets to exult his pain in the drama of his actions and words, whereas Abraham's relationship to pain and anxiety are transcended by his belief in the absurd, that he will have his son back.

Kierkegaard's prose fly by more quickly and assertively than he receives credit for. His examples fly, he gets to the heart of his point through his examples, and whilst this is a tricky read worthy of revisits, he does not attempt to obscure his point by showy verbal tricks and is, indeed, and with no remorse or hesitation, passionate about his subject matter, and even if I went through some of his book not comprehending (and trust me, I did, though I assert that, through the preceding summary that I understand his main purpose and points), it was a joy to read someone so concerned with the essence of being human and what dictates human action, and the hierarchy in such actions.

Kierkegaard warrants further reading.

And that's where I'll end. I end now.

"The genuine tragic hero sacrifices himself and everything he has for the universal; his action, every emotion in him belongs to the universal, he is revealed, and in this disclosure he is the beloved son of ethics. This does not apply to Abraham. He does nothing for the universal and he is concealed."

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